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CHAPTER 19 
The Role of Knowledge, 
Strategies, and Aptitudes 
in Cognitive Performance: 
Concluding Comments 
Wolfgang Schneiderand Franz E. Weinert 
Several years ago, a conference was organized with the aim of identifying the 
meri.ts and shortcomings of current research on memory development. ln the 
resulting publication by Weinert & Perlmutter ( 1988) the contributors agreed 
that despite the progress that has been made in understanding children 's mem-
ory , much remains to be leamed about the natural course of memory develop-
ment. As apparent from the book' s organization, strategies, metamemory, and 
the knowledge base were conceived of as major determinants of memory devel-
opment. Further, the roles of social and motivational contexts as weil as impli-
cations of individual differences were discussed in detail. 
Typical of more recent research is a shift in emphasis from the separate 
study of determinants of memory development to the analysis of po sible inter-
play among strategies and knowledge in memory performance (cf. Bjorklund, 
in press; Schneider & Pressley, 1989) . Given the enormous interest and inten-
sive research activities in the field since the mid-eighties, one major reason for 
organizing a second conference on the topic only a few years later was to get a 
better picture of the kind of progress that has been made recently in the area of 
memory development. 
Another goal of the second conference was to broaden the perspective on re-
search in the domain of memory development by including research on interac-
tions among knowledge, strategies and aptitudes conducted in areas of cogni-
tive development other than memory. In our view , memory processes represent 
a specific class of general problem- olving activities . Accordingly, the issue of 
generalizability of findings from memory research to thinking, reasoning, and 
comprehension processes in other problem-solving task deserves pecial atten-
tion. 
ln the following , we will use the state-of-the-art represented in the above 
book as a frame of reference for our comments. In doing so, we will first focus 
on a few general issues that were already addressed as potential problems in the 
mid-eighties and seem similarly controver ial today. Next , we will turn to 
some theoretical issues and empirical findings that, at least in our view, dem-
onstrate recent progress. Basic agreements and (possible) disagreements which 
were unveiled during the conference and are retlected in this book will be high-
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lighted. In closing, this chapter will discuss issues that , in our opinion, have 
been thus far neglected and should be addre sed in future re earch . 
Persistent Problems 
From the very beginning of the conference, we realized that controversy still 
remained over several conceptual issue already discu sed intensively during 
the earlier meeting. In our view , this is mainly due to the fact that we are not 
dealing with precisely defined psychological constructs but with a collection of 
" fuzzy" concepts: Term like strategies, domain-specific knowledge, or meta-
cognitive knowledge all have in common that they denote ill-defined categorie 
(see also Ornstein, this volume). 
According to Wellman (1983), there are four basic definitionaJ features of 
fuzzy concepts: 
First , the concept encompasses an essential , central distinction. However, this distinc-
tion serves to anchor the concept , not intentionally define it. Second, prototypic central 
instances of the concept are easily recognized. Howevcr, third, at the periphery , agree-
ment a to whether an activity is legitimately metacognition breaks down; the defini-
tional boundaries are truly fuzzy . Related to this , and fourth , different proce ses all of 
which partake of the original distinction may be related only loo ely one to another. 
Thu the term metacognition or metamemory serves primarily to de ignate a complex of 
associated phenomena. (pp. 32f) 
We would like to add that this characterization of the fuzzy concept meta-
cognition can be easily generalized to concepts like cognitive trategies or the 
knowledge base. Regarding the complex concept of metacognition , persi tent 
problem are associated with the frequent difficulty in distingui hing between 
what is meta and what is cognitive, and with the concept 's usage in referring to 
two distinct areas of research , namely , knowledge about cognition and regula-
tion of cognition . While more recent models of metacognition (e.g ., Borkowski 
& Turner, this volume) represent progress in that they theoretically link compo-
nents of metacognition with strategies, the two source of confusion continue to 
exist. For example, the interchangeability of cognitive and metacognitive func-
tions is particularly evident in recent reviews of text processing (cf. Baker & 
Brown, 1984; Garner, 1987). As to the distinction between metacognitive 
knowledge and the regulation of cognition , we intuitively assume that both 
components of metacognition should be closely related . However, te table 
models specifying the interplay between metacognitive knowledge and the reg-
ulation of cognition for a variety of problem- olving tasks are till lacking. 
Given these persistent problems, it seems appropriate, even now , to refer to 
components of metacognition as "mysterious mechani ms" (Brown, 1987; 
Brown, Bransford , Ferrara, & Campione, 1983). 
In our view , a similar appraisal applies to the numerous conceptuaJizations 
of knowledge found in the contemporary literature. The long li t of knowledge 
components addressed in the cognitive development literature (and also in this 
book) includes term like emantic knowledge, episodic knowledge , conceptual 
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knowledge, the knowledge base, world knowledge or epistemic knowledge, 
content knowledge or domain-specific knowledge, procedural and declarative 
knowledge, and so on. Given this impressive flexibility and inconsistency in 
terminology, there is no doubt that even experts in the field get confused about 
possible denotations and connotations of the concept. For example, how should 
we conceptualize the difference between the knowledge base and world knowl-
edge (if there is any)? What about differences in the representations of concep-
tual knowledge and the knowledge of content domains? Please note in this re-
gard that the term "domain" has also been used inconsistently by researchers 
(cf. Ceci & Nightingale, this volume). Again, we would like to argue that the 
state-of-the-art has not changed considerably during the past 5 years , although 
much more research has been carried out on this topic. We do concede that 
most contributors to this volume (more or less) explicitly refer to some type of 
underlying semantic network model when considering the aspect of knowledge 
representation . We also acknowledge that recent reviews on the rote of concep-
tual knowledge and content knowledge in memory development provide in-
depth analyses of the mechanisms by which knowledge mediates memory per-
formance (e.g., Bjorklund, Muir & Schneider, in press; Chi & Ceci , 1987; 
Muir & Bjorklund, this volume) , leading to insights certainly not common in 
the mid-eighties when the earlier conference took place. However, we believe 
that some of the problems raised by Ornstein and Naus (1985) have not yet 
been adequately addressed. That is , we still see the necessity to define knowl-
edge more specifically and to chart its development in a more systematic fash-
ion. lt not only seems important to find a generally acceptable definition of the 
term "domain," but also to deal seriously with the issue of how to characterize 
children's knowledge of specific domains within a developmental perspective. 
For instance, how is knowledge structured and changed within the memory sys-
tem? Are there prefabricated mental structures, or should we assume an hierar-
chical system of multiple representational facets of information which can be 
reconstructed by some classes of available control processes? 
During the course of this conference, we soon realized that the issue of strat-
egy definition has remained controversial. About 5 years ago , several heaty 
discussions concerned the issue of whether strategies are deliberately instigated 
(i.e., voluntary). While some researchers (e.g., Paris, l 988a; Paris , Newman , 
& Jacobs, 1985) offered definitions retaining an intentionality attribute in strat-
egies , others defined strategies as potentially conscious and controlable activi-
ties, ones that are nonetheless sometimes carried out automatically and uncon-
sciously (cf. Pressley, Forrest-Pressley , Elliot-Faust , & Miller, 1985). Strube 
(this volume) , in his discussion of the contribution by Ceci and Nightingale, 
Hagendorf, Kluwe, and Siegler, explicitly points to the inconsistency in termi-
nology he notices in surveying the chapters. ln his view, the crucial problem 
concerns the proper definition and reference to automatic versus controlled pro-
cessing. From his own research on retrieval strategies, Strube is lead to believe 
that most complex strategies are open to automatization, a view also shared by 
van der Meer (this volume) . 
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[f we interpret the message of most of the chapters in this volume correctly, 
then strategies should be conceived of as goal-directed proce es which may in-
volve automatic, nonstrategic operations, but which are potentially available to 
consciousness. As Bjorklund, Muir, and Schneider (in press) noted, such a def-
inition is not without problems, because consciousness is itself a sticky i sue. 
More specifically, the requirement that strategies be potentially available to 
consciousness leads to biased observation, since such strategies would be no-
ticed more in older children and adults than in younger children. Thus, Bjork-
lund et al. emphasize that the stipulation on children of any age (particularly 
young children) to prove they are aware of what they are doing before one can 
declare them Strategie is a serious shortcoming of such a definition. Hence, it 
appears that we are still far away from a strategy conceptualization that is unre-
servedly acceptable to the majority of cognitive psychologists. However, the 
lesson learned from the two conferences is that, regardless of how strategy is 
defined, the definition should be explicit to avoid fundamental misunderstand-
ings. 
Major Accomplishments 
In spite of the various persistent conceptual problems mentioned above (which 
have certainly complicated our discussion), it was not particularly difficult to 
locate areas where considerable progress has been made during the pa t few 
years. As it is thoroughly impossible to discuss all the relevant issues raised in 
this volume, given the constraints on space, we have selected a few particularly 
interesting and worthwhile topics for more detailed scrutiny. ln our view, ma-
jor accomplishments during the second half of this decade relate to (1) early 
strategy-knowledge interactions, (2) the development of comprehensive cogni-
tive or metacognitive models representing strategy knowledge interactions, (3) 
the systematic inclusion of motivational, educational, and cultural factors in the 
analysis of strategy-knowledge interactions, and (4) an increasing tendency to-
wards explicitly considering individual differences and aptitude issues in the 
analysis of these interactions. 
The lnterplay Between Knowledge and Strategies in Young Children 
Our opinion about how competent and Strategie young children can be has 
changed considerably during the past 20 years. ln the 1970s, children younger 
than age 6 were thought to be generally nonstrategic in cognitive endeavors. 
Research conducted during the late eventies and early eighties was effective in 
changing this view dramatically. With respect to early memory development , 
Wellman (1988) gave an impressive account on preschoolers ' early memory 
strategies, emphasizing that memory activities in young children are strategic 
and mnemonic, that young children's memory strategies are variable and fre-
quently employed, and that they can have significant impacts on memory per-
formance. Wellman referred to the importance of asking broader question 
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about the development of memory strategies like, where do effective strategies 
come from, or how are they developed. In speculating about possible explana-
tions for early strategy developments , Wellman pointed to the importance of in-
itially faulty strategies; the assumption was that effective strategies evolve di-
rectly from earlier faulty strategies. Note that young children's knowledge base 
was not explicitly considered in this explanatory approach. 
In our view, the contributions by Pemer (this volume) and Sodian (this vol-
ume) go above and beyond the explanatory approach offered by Wellman 
( 1988) in that they additionally emphasize the conceptual basis for young chil-
dren' s strategy development. Much of what is known about this issue stems 
from an active research program dealing with young children's acquisition 
of a theory of mind, that is the acquisition of a set of explicit and intercon-
nected concepts for representing mental states (cf. Olson, Astington, & Harris, 
1988). 1 
Pemer's (this volume) conceptualization of "experiential awareness" is 
strongly influenced by a theory of mind approach. The basic assumption is that 
young children's understanding that informational access Ieads to knowledge 
should influence young children's episodic memories, in Tulving's sense. By 
using a slightly rephrased definition of episodic memory ("episodic memory 
mediates the remembering of personal experience of events"), Pemer predicts 
that great improvement in free recall (unparalleled in semantically cued re-
trieval tasks) should be found as soon as young children develop experiential 
awareness. If this view can be supported by empirical data-supplementing 
and extending the preliminary findings presented by Perner-it would mean 
that a type of basic metacognitive knowledge seems crucial for early memory 
development. 
In a similar vein , Sodian (this volume) illustrates the importance of young 
children's theory of mind for the development of cognitive strategies. Her re-
search supports the conclusion that "theory changes" in children's intuitive 
epistemology (understanding the conditions of knowledge formation) provide 
the conceptual base for developmental changes in strategy use. 
In sum, then, the contributions by Pemer and Sodian both indicate that early 
memory development may be strongly influenced by the acquisition of knowl-
edge components. Although these assumptions have not yet been adequately 
tested, and specific problems still need to be addressed (cf. Bullock, this vol-
ume), the two chapters give account of recent progress in the area of early cog-
nitive development, pointing to fruitful directions for further research. 
Modeling Strategy-Knowledge lnteractions 
While the importance of the role played by one' knowledge ba e for remem-
bering was already demonstrated in the late l 970s, actual evidence of the inter-
action between strategy development and the knowledge base was not available 
1We hasten to add that Henry Wellman is particularly active in this research area. 
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until the l980s (cf. Chi & Ceci, 1987). With regard to developmental trends in 
strategy-knowledge interactions, controversial issues uotil the mid-eighties fre-
quently involved questions of predominance: Although most researchers basi-
cally agreed that both the knowledge base and strategies influence cognitive 
performance, they disputed about the relative importance of these two factors 
(cf. Bjorklund, 1985; Ornstein & Naus, 1985). 
ln our view, the contributions to this volume indicate that debates concerning 
this specific issue can no longer be regarded as particularly fruitful for develop-
ment of the field. As a matter of fact, researchers commjtted to a knowledge 
base approach concede that the imbalance created in their reviews of the field is 
intentional and airns at countering the traditional view that cognüive develop-
ment can be Jargely conceived of as the development of strategies and metacog-
nition (cf. Chi & Ceci, 1987). The relative importance of knowledge versus 
strategy factors may depend on the type of problem- olving task, the age of the 
problem solver, and many other factors (cf. Brown et al., 1983 for a nice illus-
tration of the complexity of thi issue). 
On reviewing the chapters of this book we have reached the ba ic agreement 
that a model indicating a feedback loop or the bidirectionality of influences 
seems to be the preference of most authors. Their assumptioo is that specific 
knowledge affects the acquisition of strategies, and that strategy deployrnent in 
turn influences the construction of pecific knowledge. As Hagendorf (this vol-
ume) points out, cognitive strategies and domain-specific knowledge are best 
viewed symbiotically, a view he thinks can be easily generalized from memory 
research to the development of problem olving and perception. 
ln our opinion, the re earch presented within this general framework leads to 
several interesting insights. For example, the issue of how specific knowledge 
influences choices among competing strategies is not only new but also theoret-
ically challenging (cf. Siegler, this volume). The new message is that strategy 
use cannot be seen as a group-level phenomenon, indicating that children of a 
specific age consistently prefer a specific strategy over other but that individ-
ual children may use multiple strategie when solving identical problem-solving 
tasks . This finding eems striking in view of the !arge body of empirical evi-
dence from training studies showing that children have difficultie with discov-
ering metacognitive information as they work with trategies (cf. Ghatala 
Levin, Pressley, & Goodwin, 1986; Pressley , Levin & Ghatala, 1988). Ac-
cording to these studie ba ed on memory research, children are le s likely than 
adults to discover that one of two alternative intentional strategie can better fa-
cilitate a particular type of required performance. Siegler's findings ugge t 
that this metacognitive bottleneck is often bypas ed with potential trategy 
choices in familiar domains not influenced much by explicit, metacognitive 
processes but rather functioning largely through a simple associative Jearning 
mechanism. 
Even more provocative is that Siegler's discovery wa mainly ba ed on 
young children's elf-reports. While a single-strategy-u e model fit the data 
weil, a multiple-strategy-use model relying on children's report fit the data 
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even better. This finding indicates that the large body of literature questioning 
the veridicality of verbal reports as data may somewhat overstate the case, at 
least when children are concemed (cf. Ericsson & Simon, 1980; Nisbett & 
Wilson 1977). Siegler's results show that relying solely on derived measures 
of strategy use may not always give a true impression, a finding that has also 
been demonstrated in the case of organizational strategies (cf. Schneider, 
1986). Finally, Siegler's results point to a problem in model testing procedures 
often neglected in empirical research; i.e. , the fact that a model fits the data 
weil does not exclude the possibility that an alternative theoretical model may 
fit the data significantly better. 
As indicated by Siegler, formal modeling approaches seem important for our 
better understanding of the strategy-knowledge interactions. Given that the 
many competing information processing models developed by cognitive psy-
chologists and experts in artificial intelligence are not easy to evaluate with re-
spect to their possible implications for this issue, the systematic approach taken 
by Rabinowitz (this volume) seems particularly constructive and helpful. By 
focusing on the rote conceptual knowledge can play in the processing of infor-
mation , Rabinowitz identifies major limitations of two broad categories of in-
formation processing models (i.e ., models using the mind as computer meta-
phor versus models using the metaphor of mind as brain) dominating the field. 
The major problem of models using the computer metaphor is that conceptual 
knowledge is reduced to an enabling role, as active strategic processes operate 
on a passive knowledge structure. On the other hand, the distinction between 
knowledge structures and strategic processes is eliminated in connectionist 
models using the metaphor of mind as brain. Consequently, Rabinowitz points 
out that neither model category seems suited to adequately capture the dynamic 
nature of conceptual knowledge and the control of processes afforded by strate-
gies. lnstead a hybrid model of information processing is needed to represent 
conceptual knowledge in terms of a dynamic knowledge system associated with 
an active processing component. While we generally agree with Rabinowitz' 
view, we hope that future conceptualizations will give more thorough consider-
ation to the developmental perspective, thus modeling patterns of trategy-
knowledge interactions that may change quantitatively and qualitatively as 
a function of increasing "maturity" or speed of the information processing 
system. 
The modeling approaches described so far are comparatively narrow in per-
spective , since they focus solely on the interplay between strategies and either 
conceptual or domain-specific knowledge. We do not claim that this is the per-
spective adhered to most closely by the majority of contributors to this volume. 
Rather, we believe that the major discrepancy apparent in the various contribu-
tions concerns the degree of complexity in modeling approaches that the au-
thors are willing to accept and the level of generalizability of interactional pat-
tems across domains they are ready to tolerate. 
Some contributors to the volume eem to hold the view that the feedback 
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loop between strategies and knowledge operates domain-specifically. For ex-
ample, Ceci and Nightingale (this volume) note that there is less across-task 
consistency than the traditional view would lead one to suspect. Note, how-
ever, that Ceci and Nightingale refer to a broadened view of domain-specific-
ity. On the other hand, Muir and Bjorklund (this volume) favor a conceptual-
ization in which the effects of knowledge "decontextualization" increase with 
age. Finally, Borkowski and Turner (this volume) argue that strategies possess 
attributes and characteristics that are transferable acro s time, settings, and 
tasks. 
How to account for these differences? The view offered by Ceci and Nightin-
gale represents the prevailing theoretical trend based on experimental research 
that strategy use is limited by domain boundaries and the available knowledge 
within each domain. As children grow older, they acquire more knowledge 
within a given domain, which may also lead to an expansion of domain bound-
aries and decontextualization of knowledge effects as described by Muir and 
Bjorklund. Borkowski and Tumer's divergence of opinion seems due to a dif-
ference in their research focus: Borkowski and associates have been interested 
in strategy transfer for some time now, an issue certainly less interesting for 
researchers who are primarily concemed with the role of domain-specific 
knowledge on cognitive performance. 
Not surprisingly, the theoretical model proposed by Borkowski and Turner is 
very complex. This model of metacognition (also known as the Good Strategy 
User Model) was first developed by Pressley, Borkowski, and O'Sullivan 
(1985) and later extended by Borkowski , Pressley, Schneider, and colleagues 
(cf. Borkowski, Johnston , & Reid , 1987; Pre sley, Borkowski , & Schneider, 
1987; Schneider & Pressley, 1989). While the original model wa built primar-
ily to substantiate metamemory theory, its components can be easily applied to 
a wider range of cognitive activities. We do not want to reiterate Borkowski 
and Tumer's detailed description of the model but would like to ju t point out a 
few interesting implications. In our view , one of the major advantages of this 
model is that it accounts for different declarative knowledge components (i .e., 
specific strategy knowledge, general trategy knowledge, relational strategy 
knowledge) which are conceived of as interactive and mutually dependent 
causes of strategy use and cognitive performance. ln addition, the model em-
phasizes the importance of so-called Metacognitive Acquisition Procedure , 
that is, higher level processes that help children leam more about lower level 
strategies. These processes which are allegedly the heart of metacognition, 
giving it transsituational applicability , have also been referred to as elf-regu-
lation and executive functioning. 
A econd advantage of the model concems the conceptualization of General 
Strategy Knowledge first introduced by Pressley et al. (1987). Borkowski, 
Pressley, and their associates believe that a unique property of General Strategy 
Knowledge is its motivational character. That is , general knowledge about the 
value of behaving strategicaUy may result in expectations about elf-efficacy, 
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which, in turn, rnay motivate children to confront new challenging learning 
tasks. Thus, General Strategy Knowledge is also essential for strategy general-
ization in that it creates attributions with respect to self-efficacy and beliefs 
about the growth of the rnind. ln our view, one of the specific rnerits of the 
model is that it stirnulates a broader research perspective, including rnotiva-
tional and other contextual factors , which will be discussed in rnore detail in 
the following section. On the whole, the model implies that components of 
metacognitive knowledge can play an irnportant rote in cognitive performance 
(see also Kluwe, this volume). 
One of the shortcomings of the rnodel presented by Borkowski and Turner is 
that domain-specific knowledge is not represented. This is somewhat surpris-
ing, because in an earlier chapter Borkowski and associates emphasized that fu-
ture research on metamemory should explicitly account for the relationship be-
tween domain-specific knowledge and individual metamemory cornponents (cf. 
Borkowski, Milstead, & Haie, 1988). We should note, however, that domain-
specific knowledge has been included as a major component in updated ver-
sions of the Good Strategy User Model (cf. Pressley, Borkowski, & Schneider, 
1987; in press). As the contributions by Pressley, Wood, and Woloshyn (this 
volume) and Schneider, Körkel, and Weinert (this volume) show, there is em-
pirical evidence that metacognition and strategy use interact with domain-spe-
cific knowledge: Metacognitive processes are helpful in activating and em-
ploying prior knowledge, and prior knowledge in turn improves the accuracy of 
metacognitive processes. 
The Impact of Motivational, Educational, 
and Cultural Factors 
lt is not really a new insight that a broader perspective is needed to better un-
derstand cognitive development definitively. As a matter of fact, several papers 
presented at the earlier conference were devoted to the impact of social and 
motivational contexts on memory development (cf. Ceci , Bronfenbrenner, & 
Baker, 1988; Paris, 1988a; Verdonik , 1988). Basically it was agreed that in-
formation-processing models of cognition are by themselves insufficient de-
vices for understanding children's capabilities, as weil as for charting the tran-
sitional mechanisms of development. As Ceci et al. (1988) pointed out, it is 
only through adding real-world complexity to our models that we can under-
stand more about the nature of cognitive development. As the issue has been 
highly familiar and generally accepted for some time, progress rnade in this 
particular area of re earch is vital. ln our view, one of the specific advantages 
of the more recent approaches can be seen in the attempt to theoretically link 
issues of context effects to existing inforrnation proces ing models, thus trying 
to provide a rnore comprehensive, multidirnensional rnodel of cognitive devel-
oprnent. This perspective is apparent in the chapter by Ceci and Nightingale 
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(this volume), as weil as in the contributions regarding the impacts of metacog-
nitive knowledge. 
As pointed out earlier, Borkowski's and Tumer's model of metacognition 
(this volume) highlights and explains the importance of executive processes and 
attributional beliefs in producing general problem-solving skills. Emphasis is 
placed on insight into the importance of effort and the value of effort in influ-
encing task outcomes: children who possess metacognitive knowledge about 
useful strategies and who realize that effortful strategy deployment results in 
improved perfonnance wilJ be more motivated to work hard, as compared to 
peers who attribute academic outcomes to uncontrollable factors (see Borkow-
ski and Turner, this volume, Carr, this volume, and Kurtz, this volume, for 
empirical evidence supporting this view). lt appears, then that the model of 
metacognition described by Borkowski, Pressley, and associates may serve as a 
good starting point for exploring the interfaces of motivation and cognition in 
various problem-solving activities. 
As noted by Kurtz (this volume) and Carr (this volume), focusing on the in-
terplay between "skiJI and will" (Paris, l 988b) seems to be a step in the right 
direction, but probably not a big enough one to fully understand the complexity 
of relationships among cognitive, metacognitive, and motivational variables . lt 
is now well established that home and school environments have an impact on 
cognitive development. As a consequence, the roles of parents and teachers in 
influencing children's knowledge acquisition have been thoroughly explored in 
recent studies (cf. Carr, Kurtz, Schneider, Turner, & Borkowski, 1989; Kon-
tos , 1983; Moely, et al„ 1986; Stevenson, 1988). As parenting and teaching 
styles vary systematically both within and across nations and cultures, cross-
cultural studies seem further necessary for a better understanding of the univer-
sals and individual variations of cognitive development (Kurtz, this volume). 
Complicating the matter even more , Carr (this volume) emphasizes the need to 
more closely address issues of development across the life span. Her point is 
that the knowledge base, cognitive strategies, metacognitive components , and 
motivational factors have changing roles at different stages of development. 
According to this view, issues of intraindividual change over time need to be 
addressed via longitudinal research designs. 
The increasing interest in contextual and cultural influences on cognitive \ 
development indicates that we are ready to expand our perspective and to ask l 
the "bigger questions" in developmental psychology (Appelbaum & McCall , 
1983). However, we must still resolve how tobest deal with the complexity of 
both the theoretical framework and research designs , particularly from a meth-
odological point of view. While causal modeling or structural equation model-
ing (SEM) procedures favored by Kurtz (this volume) and Carr (this volume) 
represent powerful general tools for the analysis of longitudinal data , they 
should not be conceived of as panaceas (see Rogosa, 1988; Schneider, 1989, 
for a discussion of selected problems of SEM models). In particular, the prob-
lem of adequately testing the data fit in SEM models still needs to be solved, 
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and the problem of cross-validating SEM models should receive closer atten-
tion . Moreover, narrowing the knowledge gap between statisticians and re-
searchers seems to be a particularly important precondition for proper usage of 
SEM procedures in the behavioral sciences. By and large, SEM procedures can 
be seen as a promising statistical tool for the complex analyses proposed by re-
searchers interested in environmental and cultural effects on cognitive develop-
ment. 
Individual Differences and Aptitude Issues 
Participants in the earlier conference generally agreed that the topic of individ-
ual differences in cognitive development has been neglected in research follow-
ing the information-processing approach (cf. Knopf, Körkel , Schneider, & 
Weinert, 1988; Weinert, 1988). Ln contrast , contributions to this volume docu-
ment an increased interest in detailed analyses of how knowledge, strategies, 
and individual differences interact to produce cognitive functioning (cf. Sie-
gier, this volume) . 
Two major approaches can be identified: while most authors equate individ-
ual differences with aptitude-related differences (e.g. , Borkowski and Turner, 
this volume; Muir & Bjorklund , this volume; van der Meer, this volume} , oth-
ers use the expert-novice paradigm to explore the impact of a rich knowledge 
base on strategy deployment and cognitive performance (Schneider, Körkel , & 
Weinert, this volume; Staszewski, this volume) . 
Regarding the first approach, an interesting theoretical treatment is presented 
by Ceci and Nightingale on the topic of how knowledge development is related 
to intellectual development. The term "cognitive complexity" is used to indi-
cate intelligence in the traditional view , redefined as the result of efficient pro-
cesses (strategies) operating in elaborated knowledge domains. As noted by 
Strube (this volume) , this means that cognitive style is back, but reconceptual-
ized in terms of the information-processing approach. lnterestingly enough, this 
view of cognitive complexity/intelligence implies that it is primarily domain-
specific in childhood , and may eventually become "trans-domainal" in adult-
hood. Needless to say, this conceptualization does not have much in common 
with the trait concept of intelligence. 
Ceci and Nightingale emphasize the role of knowledge in intellectual devel-
opment, a perspective also shared by Muir and Bjorklund (this volume). From 
their analysis of memory differences among children with different Iearning 
abilities (i.e„ learning-disabled vs . nondisabled children, gifted vs. nongifted 
children), Muir and Bjorklund conclude that knowledge-base factors are an im-
portant source of differences among children of differing intellectual abilities. 
However, by using a different memory paradigm, van der Meer (this vol-
ume) arrives at a different conclusion . In her study with retarded and normal 
children, observed performance differences were not due to differences in the 
conceptual knowledge base but to differences in the spontaneous use of this 
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knowJedge. SimiJarJy, Borkowski and Turner (this voJume) conclude, from a 
review of training studies, that poor learners faiJ to invent mature strategies to 
meet changing task demands. While the findings reported by Borkowski and 
Turner appear to support the assumption that retarded chiJdren suffer from 
(lower JeveJ-) strategy deficiencies, the authors take this expJanatory approach. 
They further argue that retarded chiJdren Jack metacognitive, executive skills 
which seem to be important for Jearning because they assist in the impJementa-
tion of lower-lower strategies. In our view, the eJaborative interrogation pro-
cedures introduced by PressJey, Wood, and WoJoshyn quaJify as an exarnpJe of 
such a skill, in that it directs the activation of prior knowledge reJated to new 
to-be-Jeamed information. 
What can be inferred from the discrepant results? We tend to beJieve that 
whiJe all the authors report valid findings, their vaJidity may be restricted to 
specific domains and task requirements. In future research , systematic compari-
sons should explore the importance of (the Jack of) knowledge, strategies, and 
metacognitive skills across different domains and for different probJem-solving 
situations. 
There is definitively more agreement as to the cruciaJ roJe of domain-specific 
knowledge when experts in a designated domain are compared with novices. 
The tremendous impact of a rich knowJedge base on memory performance is 
apparent in the results reported by Schneider, KörkeJ , and Weinert (this vol-
ume). Y ounger soccer experts outperformed older soccer novices on various 
measures assessing chiJdren's memory and comprehension of a story dealing 
with a soccer game, thus reversing the typical age trend. SimiJarJy, Staszewski 
(this voJume) provides ampJe evidence for the outstanding role of a particularly 
rich knowledge base in tuming a long-distance runner into an exceptional mne-
monist. In the study described by Staszewski, it was shown that an extensive, 
well-organized knowJedge base enabled a subject to (a) encode eJaborate repre-
sentations of random-digit Iists and (b) retrieve this information accurately, ef-
ficiently , and flexibJy . lt is the specific advantage of the single-subject design 
chosen by Staszewski that made fine-grained anaJyses of the respective roles of 
semantic encoding and retrieval process in memory performances availabJe, 
demonstrating how knowJedge, practice, and strategies reJate to expert perfor-
mance. 
The contributions by Schneider et al., as well as by Staszewski show that 
general aptitudes are Jess important when it comes to explaining expert perfor-
mances . Staszewski reports that his subject was of average aptitude and empha-
sizes that knowledge acquired through experience, rather than innate talents or 
abiJities best accounts for extraordinary capabilities. Systematic comparisons of 
Jow-abiJity versus high-ability experts and novices conducted by Schneider et 
al. Jed to the conclusion that ability deficits can be compensated by a rich do-
main knowJedge. On the other hand, Schneider's et al. first results suggest tbat 
procedural as well as decJarative metacognitive knowJedge may interact with 
the knowJedge base in yielding optimal performance. 
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Future Research Perspectives 
Drawing inferences about future research perspectives from the present state-
of-the-art can either be a somewhat monotonous task or a risky endeavor. Cer-
tainly , our concluding remarks have highlighted a number of well-defined is-
sues that should be addressed in future research . These issues have either been 
raised specifically in designated chapters or are indirectly inferred through 
comparisons between the different contributions. 
Considerable progress has been made during the past decade in the empirical 
analysis and theoretical modeling of the interplay among content knowledge, 
strategy use, and cognitive performance. However, our scientific knowledge in 
all these areas is still rather vague and inadequate. This applies especially to the 
development of cognitive competencies and the emergence of individual differ-
ences. There are also a great many discrepancies among the different theoreti-
cal positions postulated. In our view, one of the reasons for this state of affairs 
is that most of the hypotheses formulated are derived from designs using a 
single experimental paradigm and are focusing on just one domain. Conse-
quently , the validity of such findings across several domains remains unclear, 
creating the risk of overgeneralization. Two things are needed to correct this 
state of affairs: First, to back away from the compulsion toward novelty so 
prevalent in psychological research in formulating research questions , and to 
avoid working within the confines of one self-selected paradigm. Second, to 
conduct more replications of studies while sy tematically varying one critical 
variable. Only by taking such steps will conditions be created in which theoret-
ical abstraction supercedes vague, empirical generalizations . lt is also neces-
sary to supplement the analysis of group data in conjunction with single sub-
ject designs, since intra.individual variability of cognitive processes is greater 
than has been assumed by static models (Siegler, this volume; Ceci & Nightin-
gale, this volume) . Only the systematic expansion and completion of ongoing 
research along with a reduction in the units of analysis will allow for greater 
precision in investigating such aspects as the rules which govem the interplay 
of knowledge conceming different qualities and quantities , processes influenc-
ing metacognitive understanding, motivational attitudes, and the use of specific 
strategies as determinants of cognitive performance. 
Our present state of knowledge suggests that similar performance levels will 
be attained under different (sufficient but not necessary) sets of conditions , that 
many functional compensatory effects prevail among different cognitive re-
sources, and that similar sets of cognitive prerequisites will produce differing 
levels of performance within different task contexts. Many important research 
issues and the corresponding strategies can be characterized according to this 
point of view. Nonetheless , are we really interested in predicting and making 
recommendations for the course of future research? Given that progress in sci-
ence is not only achieved through hard work and repeated effort, but that cre-
ative thinking is an equally essential element, is it not reasonable to expect that 
the current state of research will suffice to prompt researchers to ask many dif-
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ferent questions generating new approaches and finding creative answers for 
unre olved problem areas. lt is hoped that a creative and open attitude will 
mark future research. We would like to illustrate this point by using a specific 
example to ask a series of related questions. 
Tue example chosen concems the role of aptitudes or abilities in cognitive 
development and human performance (for a general di cussion see Ackerman, 
1987; Ackerman, Sternberg, & Glaser, 1989). Although the title of this book 
incorporates the term "aptitude," the individual chapters contain very few refer-
ences to empirical studies and theoretically substantive inquiries. Does the 
expert-novice paradigm really teil the whole story in implying that the level of 
domain-specific knowledge, as opposed to the impact of general intellectual 
aptitudes, completely dominates understanding, problem-solving, and memory 
performance in content-specific tasks (Schneider, Körkel, & Weinert, this vol-
ume)? How is such expertise acquired? Can one acquire different kinds of 
knowledge simply by being properly motivated and by having a so-called 
power of long-term will (Nietzsche) or do aptitude-related constraints exist 
which influence the speed, quality, and (possibly) the asymptote of knowledge 
acquisition? What do differences in the quality of knowledge depend on, when 
defined as a quality embedded in a differentiated and hierarchically organized 
network, with variable mental representations (especially various forms of 
abstract representation), as weil as flexible access to and adaptability of the 
knowledge base in varying contexts? Are individual differences in the quality 
of knowledge due only to available prior knowledge, time pent leaming, ef-
fort, and quality of instruction, or are these differences influenced by more or 
less general aptitudes, at least during the early stages of content knowledge ac-
quisition? Assuming that aptitude do have such an impact, the next question to 
be addressed is whether compensatory effects occur between aptitude levels 
and learning effort, or whether aptitude-dependent limitations exist at lea t 
for very complex bodies of knowledge. Could it be that the level of relatively 
general aptitudes (under otherwise constant conditions) affect the speed of 
knowledge acquisition and the quality of the knowledge structure, thus making 
quantity and quality of knowledge acquired within a given time span better in-
dicators of aptitudes than the measurements of general intelligence cores? Can 
findings showing the negligible effects of aptitudes on the acquisition and use 
of knowledge in simple task performance be used to make conclusions about 
the role of aptitudes in developing fundamental skills solve more difficult 
tasks? 
Do genetic determinants of the development of the knowledge and the differ-
ent forms of information processing exist? lf so, how do sucb genetic determi-
nants affect the acquisition, storage and use of the knowledge base? What role 
is played by individual learning processes in this context? We are not primarily 
referring to the short-term learning proces es examined in most training stud-
ies, but to the long-term acquisition of knowledge and skills spanning many 
years. Finally, how significant are diverse cultural and educational contexts in 
this respect? 
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With regard to knowledge acquisitions, these are some of "the bigger ques-
tions" (Applebaum & McCall, 1983) which will be posed by future research in 
developmental psychology. Answering these questions presupposes not only 
the continuity of normal science, but also the development of new theoretical 
models and empirical paradigms. However, such changes in scientific thinking 
cannot be predicted or can only be predicted at great risk. Hopefully, therefore, 
the formal presentations and the informal discussions during the second Munich 
Conference have stimulated many fresh, new, and sophisticated ideas. Perhaps 
at a third Munich Conference we will be able to acquaint ourselves with the re-
sulting research. 
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